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Offer to settle in an originating application: Is it an offer under the UCPR? 
 
Offers to settle – whether an offer in an originating application is an offer under the UCPR 
– Calderbank offers – whether applicant should have costs on the indemnity basis  
In Northbound Property Group Pty Ltd v Carosi (No.2) [2013] QSC 189 McMeekin J 
considered the implications for the appropriate costs order of an offer to settle a 
proceeding commenced by an originating application. 
Facts 
By an originating application filed on 10 April 2013 the applicant sought declarations that it 
had validly terminated a contract for the purchase of certain land and improvements and 
that it was entitled to be repaid a deposit paid under that contract. The application was 
heard by McMeekin J on 14 June 2013. 
On 19 June 2013 the registrar delivered his Honour’s reasons in the matter. His Honour 
made the declarations sought by the applicant and ordered that the respondents repay the 
deposit they had forfeited. It was indicated that the applicant should have its costs, though 
no submissions had at that stage been made as to the appropriate costs order. 
The applicant had made an offer to settle in a letter dated 28 May 2013. Effectively it 
offered to bear its own costs if the respondent acceded to the application. The offer 
complied in form with the requirements of r360 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld) (UCPR). 
On the basis of its offer, the applicant applied for its costs to be assessed on the indemnity 
basis. 
Legislation 
Chapter 9 Part 5 of the UCPR provides for costs implications for offers to settle made under 
that part. In relation to offers to settle by the plaintiff, r360(1) provides: 
 
Costs if offer to settle by plaintiff 
360(1) If— 
(a) the plaintiff makes an offer to settle that is not accepted by the defendant 
and the plaintiff obtains a judgment no less favourable than the offer to 
settle; and 
(b) the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was at all material times willing and 
able to carry out what was proposed in the offer; 
the court must order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs calculated on the 
indemnity basis unless the defendant shows another order for costs is appropriate in 
the circumstances. 
 
Analysis 
Some of the submissions in relation to the appropriate costs order for the respondents 
involved, explicitly or implicitly, an attack on the judgment made. McMeekin J made it clear 
that it is not appropriate on an application for costs for legal practitioners to attempt to 
reargue points which had been already determined in the substantive matter. 
It was also submitted for the respondents that the concession made by the applicant as to 
costs, being the only concession in the applicant’s offer, was not a real concession at all. 
McMeekin J rejected this contention. In his Honour’s view a willingness to give up an order 
for costs in a winning case involved a compromise. 
McMeekin J then considered whether the applicant’s offer was made under Chapter 9 Part 
5 of the UCPR or rather whether it was akin to a Calderbank offer. His Honour noted in that 
context that the applicant had complied with the formal requirements of r360 of the UCPR. 
However, the proceedings were commenced by originating application, not by way of a 
claim and statement of claim. In his Honour’s view the reference in rr360-361 to ‘plaintiffs’ 
and ‘defendants’ was suitable for proceedings commenced by claim and statement of claim, 
not to proceedings commenced by originating application. 
His Honour regarded it as perhaps even more cogent that the rules refer to the obtaining of 
a “judgment” no less favourable than the offer. “Judgment” is defined in Schedule 4 to the 
UCPR by reference to r659 which provides: “Final relief granted in a proceeding started by 
claim is granted by giving a judgment … ” 
In his Honour’s view, that definition plainly restricted the term “judgment” to proceedings 
commenced by claim and excluded proceedings where final relief had been obtained but by 
way of an originating application. He found support for this construction of the rules in the 
decisions of the Supreme Court in Bank Polska Kasa Opieki Spolka Akcyjan v Opara & Anor 
(No.2) [2010] QSC 358 and Walton Construction (Qld) Pty Ltd v Plumber by Trade Pty Ltd 
(No.2) [2012] QSC 280. 
McMeekin J concluded that the proper characterisation of the offer was that it was one not 
made under Chapter 9 Part 5 of the UCPR and that accordingly the right to indemnity costs 
was not automatic. His Honour turned to consider authorities relating to Calderbank offers, 
and then summarised the applicable principles as follows (at [37]): 
“(a) The onus falls on the offeror (here the applicant) to convince the court that it should 
exercise its discretion in its favour, the offeree having acted unreasonably or imprudently in 
rejecting the offer: see Lawes v Nominal Defendant [2007] QSC 103; Jones v Bradley (No.2) 
[2003] NSWCA 258; Evans Shire Council v Richardson (No.2)[2006] NSWCA 61 per Giles, Ipp 
and Tobias JJA at [26]. 
“(b) The offeror must also show that the offer involved some element of compromise: see 
Jones v Millward [2005] 1 Qd R 489; 
“(c) The court strives to achieve fairness in the result: see the discussion in Commonwealth v 
Gretton [2000] NSWCA 118.” 
As it had been concluded that there was an element of compromise in the concession made 
that each side should bear their own costs, McMeekin J focused on the question of whether 
the respondent’s non-acceptance of the offer involved a degree of imprudence or 
unreasonableness. 
Although he regarded the reasons advanced by the respondent for not accepting the offer 
as “entirely unpersuasive”, his Honour also noted that questions of construction are 
notoriously difficult, and that there are many cases which show that different minds can 
reasonably differ on the meaning of contracts and the effect of correspondence. His Honour 
also referred in this context to the statement by White J (as her Honour then was) in Di 
Carlo v Dubois [2002] QCA 225 at [40] that “[i]t is important that applications for the award 
of costs on the indemnity basis not be seen as too readily available ... ”. 
On balance his Honour was not persuaded that the respondents acted unreasonably or 
imprudently in pursuing their defence of the suit, and he ordered that they should pay the 
applicant’s costs on the standard basis. 
Comment 
It is apparent a different costs order would have been made in this case, had the rules in 
Chapter 9 Part 5 of the UCPR applied, rather than the principles applicable to Calderbank 
offers. 
The distinction clearly has significant implications and is one that practitioners should bear 
in mind when formulating their proceedings. Frequently there will be alternative ways to 
frame a proceeding, so that will be possible to commence it by claim and statement of 
claim, or by an originating application. The benefits which may potentially be obtained by 
skilful use of the offer to settle procedures under the UCPR may be a powerful factor in 
favour of choosing the former procedure. As the gap between standard and indemnity costs 
appears to be widening, the case for this approach is becoming stronger. 
The widening of the rules in Chapter 9 Part 5 of the UCPR so as to apply in appropriate cases 
to proceedings commenced by originating application is perhaps one matter which bears 
consideration by the courts’ Rules Committee. 
 
 
